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1 II OGDEN, UTAH, MARCH 3, 19 98 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 II THE COURT: Thank you. Call the matter of 
7 Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC versus Babcock and this is 
8 the Morgan case. See if I can refer to the number. 
9 960500010. First of all welcome to our court here in 
10 Ogden. Appreciate you folks making the trip here. I 
11 also apologize for some delay since we tried this case 
12 in getting the decision to you. I've been fairly busy 
13 and it's just taken some time to get back to you. 
14 Start off by making the observation that this 
15 is a decision the court is going to make on the record 
16 with the parties present, following a several-day trial 
17 that was conducted in Morgan. My compliments to you, 
18 counsel, in the way the case was presented, and I've 
19 had a chance to review the facts and evidence before 
2 0 me, the exhibits, and also the trial briefs that have 
21 been submitted, and I'd imw go into my findings and 
22 issue my decision in this case 
23 First of all, by way of general observation 
24 the ground that is in dispute that is clear between the 
25 parties is what's turned out to be kind of a 
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1 triangular-shaped piece of property. And it is the 
2 triangle that exists between the actual survey line and 
3 the location of the fence line that was established by 
4 the Williams family, the predecessors in interest to 
5 the Defendant Babcocks. 
6 The ground in dispute was homesteaded by the 
7 Williams family in the 1800s. The deed from the United 
8 States government in this case contained a description 
9 that followed the section lines or quarter-section 
10 lines, and created parcels of ground that had four 
11 square corners. This was also true not only of the 
12 defendants' predecessors in interest but also of the 
13 Wilkinsons' adjoining piece of ground. Property taxes 
14 on the triangular piece that is in question have always 
15 been paid by the defendants or their predecessors in 
16 interest. 
17 I find from the evidence that was presented 
18 that two fences had existed on the boundary line -- and 
19 when I say the boundary line in this case, the actual 
20 survey line, consistent with the survey line -- and 
21 that those fences, evidence of those fences existing 
22 was presented in the form of some testimony and 
23 photographs of the old fence posts and some old wire in 
24 the area. Those fences have not existed I find for a 
25 number of years, and that the only existing fence 
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1 between the parcels of property was the fence line that 
2 took off on somewhat of a diagonal direction, and is 
3 along the line that is the line that is claimed by the 
1 plaintiffs Wilkinsons in this case. 
5 I find that that fence line that takes off on 
6 the diagonal has been the only fence in that area for 
7 well over 20 years. There was some testimony from 
8 Daryl Meacham in the case about a more recent creation 
9 of not only that diagonal fence but the fence along the 
10 actual survey line. The court believes that that 
11 testimony was helpful, and in some parts it was 
12 somewhat inconsistent with other testimony given. But 
13 I find on balance from the facts that it's been over 20 
14 years since a fence existed on the actual survey line. 
15 And I find that from the overall testimony and from the 
16 physical descriptions of what was found on the actual 
17 survey line. 
18 With regard to plaintiffs' use of the ground 
19 I find that the plaintiffs' livestock, to the extent at 
20 times there was livestock in that area, have been able 
21 to roam and graze up to the diagonal fence line; and I 
22 find that plaintiffs have also planted somewhat on the 
23 disputed triangular piece, but not up to the fence 
24 line, and certainly not 100 percent of the property. 
2 5 I'd approximate that more in the nature of about 5 0 
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1 percent of the ground, and that varied somewhat from 
2 time to time. 
3 There was some time spent on the plaintiffs' 
4 side of the case concerning minutes from planning 
5 commission meetings as the defendant Babcocks were 
6 attempting to get a subdivision approved, and reference 
7 to the Babcocks not including this ground for purposes 
8 of getting their subdivision approved. The court finds 
9 that that's somewhat of a red herring in the case 
10 because the reason the Babcocks did that is to be able 
11 to say to the planning commission, "We want the 
12 subdivision approved. We have a dispute over the 
13 triangular piece, and just for the sake of approval of 
14 the subdivision we're proposing, leave it out." 
15 Then they were able to get the subdivision 
16 approved that they were proposing, but it was still 
17 clear that the triangular piece was in dispute. So I 
18 [I don't find in any way that the Babcocks had given up 
19 || their claim or their dispute that they should be the 
20 || owners of that triangular piece. 
21 || There was also some testimony about 
22 II potentially statements made to give an indication that 
23 || that was given up, but I find that the Exhibit No. 1 
24 || that was introduced that was the agreement, it clearly 
25 || covers that there is an area that was in dispute -- and 
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I I believe itfs paragraph 2 on page 2. And it says: 
2 "Boundary line dispute exists relative to 
3 the existing fence line located along the 
4 south boundary of the Fox Hollow Subdivision. 
5 Parties do not intend to resolve that dispute 
6 by this agreement, and reserve their claims 
7 relative to that dispute." 
8 This was signed by both parties and it clearly covers 
9 that issue. 
10 Ifll continue on with some facts in a moment, 
11 but right at this point I'd like to observe that, as 
12 has been agreed by the parties, in order for there to 
13 be a boundary line by acquiescence there would have to 
14 be "occupation up to a visible line marked by 
15 monuments, fences, or buildings; mutual acquiescence in 
16 the line as a boundary for a long period of time by 
17 adjoining landowners." Now, certainly the court rules 
18 that the occupation up to the visible line, which would 
19 be the diagonal fence line, that that element is met. 
2 0 That No. 3, "for a long period of time," was 
21 met as I found already I believe that was for well over 
22 2 0 years, and the parties were adjoining landowners. 
23 The tougher question, and it's one the 
24 attorneys have dealt with and I think know well in 
25 yours briefs, is this question of mutual acquiescence 
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1 in the line as a boundary. I think attorneys and 
2 judges for ages have struggled with what acquiescence 
3 means. It's been argued by Mr. Echard's side of the 
4 case that acquiescence can mean indolence. And they've 
5 cited a case that points out factually that we had a 
6 landowner there that didn't even realize that they were 
7 being occupied on the lands that belonged to them by 
8 way of survey, and the courts have held that not even 
9 knowing about it could be indolence on your part, and 
10 that that could qualify for the element of mutual 
11 acquiescence in the line as a boundary. 
12 Now, in that case that was cited by Mr. 
13 Echard there had been a building built in that area, 
14 grazing of animals, and I don't recall but it seems to 
15 me there may have been some crop growth that had gone 
16 on in that area. 
17 Based on the strength of that case and on the 
18 overall evidence in this case of the occupation in the 
19 II area, the court believes that the presumption has been 
20 || met on the side of the plaintiffs' side of this case to 
21 || suggest that there may have been a boundary line by 
22 || acquiescence. But I can only get there if I view the 
23 || phrase acquiescence as incorporating indolence and just 
24 || not taking any action to kick someone off of the 
25 || disputed property. 
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1 The defense in this case has argued that, 
2 well, even if the court finds that, that the court 
3 should go further and take a look at whether the 
4 presumption could be rebutted by the purpose of the 
5 fence when it was installed, and by the true boundary 
6 being whether it was unknown or uncertain. Now, in 
7 this case as I said in the beginning, the original deed 
8 that came in from the United States government -- and 
9 this would have been not only the deed that went to the 
10 Williams family, the defendants' predecessors in 
11 interest, but also the Wilkinson family, called out 
12 deed lines that shouldn't be real difficult to follow. 
13 They create right angles, they follow section or 
14 quarter-section lines. And the court doesn't find in 
15 this case there was confusion or needed to be confusion 
16 about where the actual boundary line was. 
17 This is a case, and I think the record 
18 already will reflect, that the court, and I suppose the 
19 judge along with the parties, had a chance to walk over 
2 0 the ground, and it was very valuable. I found that the 
21 topography was steeper terrain than what your models 
22 depicted to me, or what I had gleaned from the 
23 photographs that were presented. The topography of the 
24 land in this case from my perspective created somewhat 
25 of a natural barrier between these adjoining property 
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1 owners in terms of their use of the land. 
2 The area that's near where the boundary line 
3 went through is quite steep, there's a cliffy area and 
4 some deep swales that made fencing in this area 
5 difficult. The court feels that it was rather 
6 graphically demonstrated. Even though I'd have to say 
7 I've worked on some fences over the year I've never had 
8 to fence ground quite that hilly. And it was quite 
9 graphically demonstrated to the court when a deep swale 
10 is attempted to be crossed with a-cattle fence that in 
11 order to go down into the low portion that you are 
12 fighting against the natural tension you are attempting 
13 to put on the fence through the rest of the run of the 
14 fence, and over time it would have a tendency to pull 
15 the fence up out of the low swale and allow an area for 
16 cattle to get down underneath it and escape. 
17 The court finds, having walked around, having 
18 looked at it, and having examined where the fence was 
19 II run, and taking into account all of the testimony in 
2 0 II the case that the angled fence was put in and it's 
21 || purpose for being put in was to keep livestock in the 
22 || Williams' parcel or the defendants' parcel, the 
23 || defendants' predecessor in interest. And that was its 
24 || sole purpose and it was not put in in order to 
25 || establish the boundary line. 
10 
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1 The court, based on that finding, is ruling 
2 in favor of the defendants in this case, and I find 
3 that the actual boundary line should be that of the 
4 survey line and should follow the line where the newer 
5 fence was put in after the defendants had torn out this 
6 older fence that followed the angled line. In so 
7 finding I also find that this was a legitimate dispute 
8 between these parties, that they certainly had the 
9 right to come to court and peacefully work out in a 
10 court of law. The court believes that each party 
11 should bear their own attorney's fees and costs in this 
12 action. Not costs, excuse me, but attorney's fees, and 
13 that the costs should be awarded to the prevailing 
14 party. 
15 Now, have I left you on your side with any 
16 questions, on the defense side? 
17 MR. SMITH: No, your honor. 
18 THE COURT: Mr. Echard? 
19 MR. ECHARD: No, your honor. 
2 0 THE COURT: All right. I'll ask you then on 
21 the defense side to prepare findings and an order for 
22 the court to sign and submit those to Mr. Echard, if 
23 you would, for his approval. 
24 Again, I thank you folks, and unless there 
25 are any questions the court will be in recess at this 
11 
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1 time 
2 MR. SMITH: Thank you, your honor. 
3 (Whereupon, the proceedings were 
4 || concluded for the day.) 
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C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, JANE G. SAVILLE, do hereby certify that I 
am a Certified Shorthand Reporter in the State of Utah; 
that as such reporter I transcribed the videotaped 
proceedings in the foregoing matter, and the foregoing 
pages constitute a full, true, and accurate report of 
the same. 
/ ^ 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah this 4? 
day of [j.jL^^tvJw^ 1998. 
3 
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Notery IPubSic J 
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J u n e 2 4 , 1998 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Are you ready to proceed with your 
arguments? 
MR. ECHARD: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay, go ahead. 
MR. ECHARD: Your Honor, if I could hand the Court 
a copy of the transcript of the Courtrs ruling, that I 
thought I had previously given to you but I thought perhaps 
having one in your hand would be helpful and I've 
highlighted in yellow the language which I think is 
relevant to what we'll be discussing today from your 
decision. This was taken from the video and transcribed by 
my secretary under my request. 
What we are here today for, your Honor, is to ask 
the Court to reverse its decision in this based upon an 
issue of law. We're not asking the Court to change the 
findings of fact. We believe the findings of fact made by 
the Court, in fact, when properly applied to the law 
compels a decision in my client's favor. 
In order to do that perhaps I could just 
generally outline the issue as I see it and then I'll go on 
and discuss in more detail in a minute. Both parties in 
their original briefs and the Court in its decision have 
concluded what the issues were on, just a minute, let me 
3 
find it here. On Page 3 on that transcript that I've given 
on the second to the last page, the court recited where it 
says XVI will continue on with some facts in a moment", 
there at the bottom of that you concluded and did accept 
the issues that had to be decided as indicated by the 
counsel. And that was, in order to show boundary line by 
acquiescence we have the occupation to a visible line. You 
found specifically that there was an occupation to a 
visible line in the next paragraph. You said that was the 
diagram of the fence. That that element was met. 
Next was for a long period of time you found 
specifically that it was for a long period of time in 
excess of 20 years. 
Number 3, by adjoining property owners, I don't 
know if you specifically said that but it was rather 
obvious that they were adjoining property owners. That was 
never an issue. 
And then the third one was mutual acquiescence 
that the line is a boundary and that is the issue. The 
Court I believe found that we carry that burden. And 1 
direct the Court's attention to the next page, the 
paragraph in the center that says "based on the strength in 
that case and the overall evidence in this case of the 
occupation and (inaudible), the Court believes that the 
presumption has been met on the plaintiff's side of this 
4 
case to suggest that there may have been a boundary line of 
acquiescence but I can only get there if I view that the 
phrase acquiescence is incorporating indolence and just not 
taking any action to kick anybody off the disputed 
property. So, it seems to me that if you're saying that 
it's based upon indolence that there was establishment of 
acquiescence in a boundary line. 
You then go back on the very last paragraph of 
that page and on the top of the next paragraph where I've 
highlighted it. That said "they are great right angles", 
talking about the original section line, "that that section 
of quarter lines"/ and the Court doesn't find in this case 
that there was confusion or needed to be confusion about 
where the actual boundary line was. That is the whole crux 
of the legal argument in this case in my opinion. But I 
understand the Court is saying that there wasn't a 
confusion between the parties but it didn't need to be 
confused. And to that degree the Court is correct and to 
find the Staker obligation as response to this. 
The Court then does go on and saw# however, that 
because this was not the original line that, and I'm 
looking now at the bottom of that same paragraph, excuse 
me, page, next to the last paragraph where I've 
highlighted, that the angle fence vtas put in and its 
purpose for being put in was to keep livestock from the 
5 
1 Williams' parcel or the defendant's parcel, the defendant's 
2 predecessor-in-interest, and that was its sole purpose and 
3 I was not put in in order to establish the boundary line. Of 
4 I course, based on that finding is ruling for the defendants, 
5 1 So, it sounds like what the court, as I 
6 understand, really is saying is that all of these things 
7 have been met. They were indolence in as established by the 
8 cases but that because — let me get the wording here 
9 correct again — that it was not for the purpose of 
10 I establishing the boundary line. 
11 I So what the court it's saying that is a fence of 
12 convenience and that, therefore, even though they occupied 
13 to that fence of convenience, that was not sufficient-
14 That just doesn't happen to be the law in the State of 
15 I Utah. And I'm sure the Court has had a chance to read our 
16 memorandum. We tried to cite extensively in those 
17 memorandums the law as it is in Utah. I want to quote— 
18 THE COURT: I might indicate to you and I think 
19 I it is fair to both sides that I've looked at these as they 
20 came in but because of this calendaring problem, I rely on 
21 the calendar that comes to me as to what' s coming this 
22 morning. And I haven't read it right before you were 
23 coming. So you should be aware of that. 
24 MR. ECHARD: Well, I assume before the Court will 
25 rule, it will go back and read it in some detail. And if 
that's the case, I will try to hit the highlights and not 
try to cover everything in the memorandum so as not to use 
the Courtfs time. But just focusing on the issue, Halliday 
versus Cluff was the case that early had been ruled by 
Judge Oaks, Dallen Oaks that was on the bench that said 
there had to be uncertainty, they had to be objective 
uncertainty in the boundary line initially or they could 
not be a determination of boundary line by acquiescence. 
That was specifically overturned in Staker. And 
referring to the Staker case, referring to the Halliday 
case said the following, and let me read it because I think 
some of the language is important, and this is quoted on 
page 5 of our responsive memorandum. Halliday and his 
progeny, and I think progeny is very important because what 
the Court is doing is overruling Halliday and all of his 
progeny and all counsel ever quotes to you in his 
memorandum is Halliday and his progeny and that was 
specifically overruled by Staker and they make it very 
clear. 
If the Court is trying to find that, I'll wait 
until you find that. 
THE COURT: (Inaudible) 
MR. ECHARD: Okay. Would require that property 
lines as shown in the record title not be displaced by 
another boundary line—and I'm skipping a few things here— 
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if he or his predecessor in title had reason to know the 
true boundary line during the period of acquiescence• In 
other words, there must have been a practical form of 
dispute. The party claiming boundary by acquiescence has 
the burden of proving the objective uncertainty as part of 
its prime case- That is saying that thatrs what Halliday 
said and they reversed that. That seems to me to be 
precisely what the case is saying, the Court is saying in 
this case, is that Halliday and is progeny said that they 
had to be uncertainty that if they knew where the boundary 
line was then they cannot have an acquiescence- That is 
not the law in the State of Utah anymore* If, in fact, the 
parties have acquiesced and even though they knew that it 
was not the original boundary, Utah law now says that 
indolence can establish that element and then
 tthat is the 
new boundary line. 
And then Staker, it goes through and some of his 
footnotes and it specifically makes the distinction of 
I boundary by acquiescence as opposed to boundary by 
agreement. Now when there is boundary by agreement/ you 
have to have an objective uncertainty- This is not a case 
of boundary by agreementr it is a boundary by acquiescence. 
And so what the Court has done in stalmr is carved out a 
new area where it no longer makes any difference that the 
fence line was a line of convenience or if there was a 
dispute. If those four elements have been met — and 
you'll note that the four elements do not include 
uncertainty. If the occupation to the visible line — 
which the Court found existed — for a long period of tirae-
- which you found existed — by adjoining property owners— 
which you found existed — and mutual acquiescence that 
it's a boundary line and that's where the case came in that 
we cited, specifically where the Court, and that's Carter 
versus Hamouth in 1996, where it indicated that indolence 
was sufficient to establish that. 
Now, counsel has pointed out in his responsive 
memorandum and I don't think even counsel or I, either one, 
knew at the time we were trying that case that Carter was 
reversed by the Supreme Court. We talked about that in the 
beginning of our memorandum. But the only basis on which 
that was reversed was the fact that the Court recalls in 
Carter, and the Court made a comment about it in its 
findings, that there was a section of land that was bounded 
some cliffs and the other person didn't even have access to 
this other line* land and they ruled, that the person, 
bringing the case could have all of it including that area 
that was bounded by cliffs for indolence. The Supreme 
Court said that that area which the defendant or the owner 
of the property did not have access to because of the 
natural barriers, that wasn't sufficient boundary line to 
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establish the deal* But it went on in its cessment and I've 
cited on page two of our responsive memorandum what the 
court said because I think it is important the court still 
recognize the indolence- It said — this is the Supreme 
Court overruling — during the years of ownership, the 
Straiters had no access to the disputed area* It was 
entirely in landlock. The trial court found that they 
could not access it from the remainder of their property 
which was on the plateau above the disputed area. They did 
not own any adjoining tract in which access could be 
gained* Because of the inability to take possession of the 
disputed area,- the indolence of the Straiters cannot be 
| construed to be acquiescence. 
The point is that the Supreme Court did not 
overrule the cistrict court - the Appellate Court's 
determination that indolence was a basis. They merely said 
that factually as to that inaccessible piece of property 
that that did not constitute indolence. And the Court will 
remember that the Prida case recited a number of other 
cases in which indolence had been specifically an issue on 
the basis upon which this should be a determination. 
Let me see if I can find, yeah, in the Carter 
case they relied upon Lane versus Walker a 1973 case. We 
cite that on page four of our memorandum, responsive 
memorandum. In which the Supreme Court had stated that 
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acquiescence can consist of indolence or consent by 
(inaudible) so the Carter court was only repeating what the 
Supreme Court had previously said to that time. And 
obviously the Supreme Court is saying again when they 
reversed Carter that they recognize that indolence can be a 
basis. So, what I'm saying is the fact that it was 
reversed did not change anything that's significant to this 
case. It was a factual determination. 
So what we have is a clear law that says that if 
parties have a fenced line that is used up to the fence 
line regardless of whether it is a fence of convenience, 
regardless of whether or not they knew about the original 
line makes absolutely no difference. Under current law, as 
long as you establish those four elements, my client 
prevails. And as I see the Court's ruling, you found that 
there was evidence of indolence in this particular case as 
to that particular line and would have ruled in my client's 
favor but for the Court's conclusion that because the line 
was known or should have been known then that therefore 
should not be the line in question. And that's where we 
think the Court should have an opportunity to correct the 
application of the law to the facts because I don't think 
the facts are disputed. 
Now, I did make an objection also to the findings 
prepared by counsel. I'd like to address that separately. 
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1 Let me get though arguing this, unless the Court wants be 
2 to do it right at the moment. 
3 THE COURT: You can address it separate. 
4 MR, ECHARD: Thank you. 
5 MR. MAAK: May it please the Court and counsel. 
6 The plaintiffs in this case are basically making two 
7 arguments to your Honor. The first is that the Court found 
8 each and every element, each of the four elements combined 
9 by acquiescence and, therefore, having so found the Court 
10 made a mistake not having ruled in their favor• The 
11 problem with that argument is that's not what your Honor 
12 did. Your Honor found three elements and 
13 them on the fourth element. We'll go into that detail a 
14 little later. 
15 The second is the plaintiffs argue that the 
16 doctrine, that if a fence is installed as a cattle 
17 containment barrier and not as a boundary the doctrine 
18 doesn't apply and they suggest that somehow that doctrine 
19 established by at least six Utah Supreme Court cases has 
20 evaporated. They haven't cited any case for that 
21 proposition, and none exists and they're wrong on that 
22 point. 
23 Let me first talk about the elements of doctrine 
24 abounded by acquiescence. Your Honor, we agree did find 
25 three elements. You found occupation up to a visible line. 
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A second element for a long time- A third by adjoining 
land owners• 
The fourth element I would like to quote because 
it answers everything. Mutual acquiescence in the line as 
a boundary line- Those words kind of get slurred when it's 
quoted to you or ignored- But that's the essence of the 
doctrine. You have two people recognizing a barrier as a 
boundary, not as a cattle barrier. 
I'd like to kind of take the Court through the 
history of this case so that what the Court said and what 
the Court did is placed in context. The plaintiff filed a 
trial brief in this case which basically relied on only one 
case, Carter verus Hamereth and argued basically that case 
to the Court and no others. And Carter versus Hamereth, at 
the time it was quoted to you, at the time it was cited to 
you, at the time it was argued to you, had been reversed on 
that point. When the argument was briefed, when the motion 
to alter or amend a judgment was filed, that case wasn't 
mentioned. It wasn't mentioned that it existed or that it 
had been reversed or anything. It was just ignored-
And in our response we pointed out that the case 
was no longer good law. And what that case said was that 
on the facts of Carter versus Hamereth the Court of Appeals 
said that indolence, without more, would suffice to 
establish boundary by acquiescence. 
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I'd like to clarify what the facts are. The 
words landlocked have been used, lack of access have been 
used. I'd like the Court to clearly know that we are not 
talking about a parcel that is sxlandlocked" in the usual 
legal sense, that is surrounded by the property owned by 
another. That wasn't the case there. This was 160 acre 
tract•of land. Thirty-two acres of which were at the base 
of a cliff. There was a geographical impediment to using 
the property at the bottom from the remainder of the 
owner's land. And in that case for, undisputedly for a 60 
year period, somebody other than the owner used the land at 
the base of the cliff because the owner couldn't get to it 
and the Court held, based on those facts, the indolence 
that the lack of the assertion of a right, the lack of a 
complaint about another person using your property was 
sufficient to establish a boundary by acquiescence. 
With that background the Court indicated its 
concern about what the case said. Your Honor said that 
based upon the evidence the plaintiffs have made a showing 
of indolence but that, based upon all of the evidence, 
boundary by acquiescence had not been established and your 
Honor identified these points. You said both parties knew 
the exact knew the exact location of the boundary. Your 
Honor even said that a fence, an old fence was installed 
right on the real boundary. Your Honor said that you 
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visited the site and you observed the fact that the slant 
cattle containment fence alleged to be the boundary 
obviously departed from the square boundary lines that the 
party's deeds recited cited which were described in quarter 
sections and half sections. You found that the only 
purpose, the only purpose of this fence line was to contain 
livestock. And I might add as a footnote that nobody can 
question that finding, your Honor, because each and every 
witness who testified for the Wilkinsons said in their 
depositions which were published at trial, that the only 
purpose of this fence was to contain livestock and that it 
had no other purpose. Every one of them said that. 
In fact, Harry Wilkinson said in his deposition 
that he agreed with Babcockfs predecessor, Elwood Williams, 
that the fence would be maintained as a cattle containment 
fence. So there is no question about what the evidence 
was. Everybody knew and understood and expected that this 
was a cattle containment fence. 
Your Honor found that the cattle containment 
fence was installed where it was because of the topography 
of the property. Your Honor found that it was not feasible 
to install a cattle containment fence on the true boundary 
because of the cliffs that your Honor walked and saw* You 
said it was not feasible to install or maintain a fence on 
the true boundary. That's very much like Carter 
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versus Hamereth. You have the edge of a plateau in Carter 
versus Hamereth which prevented access to and use of the 
adjacent property. In this case we have a geographical 
feature that precluded the installation of a cattle 
containment fence on the true boundary. Very, very 
similar. 
THE COURT: Let me just clarify something there. 
To me the case is somewhat different than the facts in 
Carter in that instead of a constant cliff, my findings are 
that there are areas along that boundary line that made a 
fence on the true boundary line very difficult, if not 
impossible, to install and keep installed and that would 
especially be true given the technology for the 
installation of fences that existed back when the old 
fences were being put in. And so, I think the record 
should reflect though there are areas past that steep area 
on the property where the fence could have been maintained 
on the boundary line but everything else you were saying is 
consistent with what my findings are. 
MR. MAAK: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MAAK: And I think it is important to point 
out that in Carter versus Hamereth you were not presented 
with a case where it was a cattle contained fence. The 
court made no findings and made no mention that the fence 
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was installed to contain cattle. Totally not there. Not a 
word like that in the decision• 
So I'd like to read what the Court, the Supreme 
Court, said when they reversed the Court of Appeals 
decision that was cited to you. Because of this inability 
to take physical possession of the disputed area, the 
indolence of the Shraders cannot be construed to be 
acquiescence. Let's see, the something must be attributed 
to the physical inability to possess the disputed area, not 
to their acquiescence in the edge of the plateau with its 
cliff and ledges as the boundary. 
So the reason for the acquiescence was based upon 
a physical feature. Now in that respect, the two cases are 
very, very similar. People have to acquiesce in the fence 
as a boundary. In this case they couldn't acquiesce it as 
a boundary because they couldn't get to it physically. 
Similarly in this case, a cattle containment 
fence could not feasibly be installed in the area of the 
gully and cliffs on our property along the true boundary. 
Now, counsel is arguing to your Honor that it's 
crystal clear that whether or not the fence is a cattle 
containment fence is irrelevant, that it's not the law of 
this state anymore. And that's just not so. There is no 
case that says that. There is no language that says that. 
Counsel is telling you that's what the cases saying. What 
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1 counsel needs to do is quote you the language that says 
2 that because it is not there. 
3 First, there is no arguing with the Court's 
4 ruling that the fence was installed as a cattle containment 
5 fence. Your Honor did say that, and there is not doubt 
6 about that and there canft be any question as a matter of 
7 fact about that because as I indicated, all of the 
8 Wilkinsons testified that that was the purpose of the 
9 fence. And Harry Wilkinson and Elwood Williams agreed to 
10 maintain it as a fence to separate their cattle. 
11 Let's talk about how this Court has construed, 
12 how our Supreme Court has construed the law of boundary by 
13 acquiescence because I think there has been some confusion 
14 injected into that history. Halliday versus Cluff was 
15 decided in 1984. Before that decision the Supreme Court in 
16 a multitude of cases held that the doctrine of boundary by 
17 acquiescence has four elements. And the four elements are 
18 almost always quoted verbatim without any change 
19 whatsoever. And every time before 1984 that the Supreme 
20 Court described what boundary by acquiescence had to have 
21 in order to be proved, the four element is mutual 
22 acquiescence in that line as a boundary. The words are 
23 always there. 
24 And along came Halliday verus Cluff. In Halliday 
25 versus Cluff the court added a fifth factor. It did not 
monkey with the first four. It didn't touch them. It 
said, in addition to those four factors there must be 
objective uncertainty as to the location of the boundary. 
That has nothing to do, according to that case, with what 
the owner's think. The Court said you have to show a deed 
conflict, something in the public record as a matter of 
title that shows a dispute or uncertainty as the location 
of the boundary or you have to show that as a matter of 
observing there is uncertainty as to the location of the 
boundary. It's important now that that does not have 
anything to do with whether the parties acquiesce in a line 
as a boundary or not. 
Now in this case, there is no objective on 
certainty but there doesn't have to be and we're not saying 
there has to, ever has to be. And we have never argued to 
your Honor that there has to be objective uncertainty 
because there isn't any. And that requirement is gone. 
Halliday versus Cluff was overruled by Staker versus 
Ainsworth in 1990 and what Staker did was it overruled 
Halliday versus Cluffs fifth element. It deleted 
objective uncertainty as a requirement. It returned us to 
the state of the law as it existed before Halliday verus 
Cluff. It didn' t change the law as it existed before 
Halliday versus Cluff. This is the language on which the 
plaintiffs in this case rely for their incorrect assertion 
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that Staker overruled all of the livestock fence cases. 
This is the letter. The court said, "We overrule 
Halliday versus Cluff and it's progeny," progeny means 
after not before," and it's progeny as to the objective 
uncertainty requirement in boundary by acquiescence. 
That's not hard language to understand. It does not say we 
have eliminated all of our cases that one must acquiesce 
any line as a boundary. It doesn't say that all of our 
cases about fences being installed to contain livestock 
cannot be boundary by acquiescence because the parties have 
been acquiesced in a line as a swap containment and not as 
a boundary. It doesn't say that. 
Now, when counsel gets up again I want him to 
read to you where it says any place that the doctrine of a 
fence installed to contain livestock can't be bounded by 
acquiescence has somehow evaporated. It would make no 
sense to do that. First, Staker itself doesn't say that. 
Second, the Staker formulation of the four elements of the 
boundary by acquiescence is verbatim, verbatim the pre 
Halliday formulation. The words are the same. 
The Court of Appeals in Jacobs versus Handrum 
which was decided after Staker is also instructive. It was 
a 1994 case. The court have stated "prior to 1984, the 
elements of boundary by acquiescence in Utah were the same 
as they are today. The requirement for boundary by 
20 
acquiescence after Staker in 1990 are the same as they were 
prior to Halliday in 1984
 % Now what I'm giving you, your 
Honor, are words out of a case that saying what I'm telling 
you. That is not what counsel has done. He says that 
something is there that isn't there. 
How much sense does if make that two landowners 
want to install a fence to contain livestock? And that's 
their intention and they both admit it as these parties 
have. For a Court to say, no, guys, wrong. You just lost 
your property. That's the pitch that is being made to you. 
It doesn't make any sense. It's not fair. The law is not 
designed to frustrate the reasonable intentions of people 
and these people, by everybody's admission, intended that 
there be a division for purposes of separating livestock. 
Not for purposes of making a gift of five acres. 
Our Supreme Court has, in at least six cases, 
stated very clearly that a fence installed for the purpose 
of containing livestock cannot be the basis of boundary by 
acquiescence. And, again, I want to read words because I 
don't want there to be confusion. Grace and Roper "the 
fence along the west side of the disputed strip was built 
for stock control and not as a boundary. Therefore, it was 
not acquiesced in as a boundary by both parties." 
Leon verus Dansie, a fence installed to contain 
cattle "eliminates any question of boundary by 
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acquiescence". It's logical. Staker didn't say anything 
about cattle fences. And it is true, your Honor, I want to 
be candid, there has been no case since Staker that has 
addressed a cattle containment fence. That hasn't happen 
yet. I submit to the Court that that shouldn't be the 
issue. In order for a person to say the law has changed, 
you have to point to the language and say where the law has 
changed. That hasn't been done and can't be done here. 
But our Supreme Court, if you believe in prophecy answered 
the question for us. 
Actually, two months before the Staker case was 
decided our Supreme Court decided the case of Grace and 
Roper v Finlinson. In that case, just two months before 
Staker, the appellant invited the Court to overrule 
Halliday versus Cluff. They raised the issue to the Court 
and said please overrule Halliday versus Cluff. This is 
what our Supreme Court said two months before it decided 
Staker. "Even if we were to so limit Halliday, Finlinson 
would not prevail here because he cannot satisfy ail of the 
elements of Fuelco". Those are usual four requirements. 
The trial court found that the fence along the west side of 
the disputed strip was built for stock control and not as a 
boundary. Therefore, it was not acquiesced in as a 
boundary by both parties. This is the Staker court talking 
two months before they decided the case that counsel is 
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telling you changed everything. 
And the Grace and Roper court is saying even if 
we do what they, in fact, did two months later, it doesn't 
matter because this is a stock control fence. It's not a 
boundary fence. 
I don't know how you wiggle out of that, your 
Honor. Those words, no matter how clever a lawyer is 
you've got to be able to say where the words are. And I'm 
giving you the words. That's what they say. 
So in contrast to counsel's argument that Staker 
eliminated cattle fences we have first, the language of 
every formulation of this doctrine with respect to the 
forth element is the same. 
THE COURT: I think I'm with you as far as that 
argument. I understand it at this point. Let me turn to 
Mr. Echard -
MR. MAAK: Very well. 
MR. ECHARD: Let me address two or three things, 
your Honor. First of all, I'd like to point out that if 
you look at counsel's memorandum of cases he just cited you 
concerning the cattle, every one of them, the dates are 
there, he didn't cite the dates to you but if I can turn to 
that page I will cite the dates. Every one of them was 
prior to 1990. There's not a single case he has cited to 
you concerning cattle boundary that predates 1990 and that 
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1 was the objection we made during the trial and our argument 
2 we've made all along is he is using old cases. 
3 THE COURT: You've made the argument though that 
4 Halliday which then gets reversed by Staker, and that 
5 Staker in effect undoes the old cases. 
6 MR. ECHARD: As to the uncertainty, yes we did. 
7 I didn't talk about Staker in dealing with the cattle fence 
8 line. 
9 THE COURT: But don't you agree with the argument 
10 that was just made that in effect Staker just undid that 
11 fifth element from Halliday and that we're back — 
12 MR. ECHARD: No. 
13 THE COURT: — with the same statement of law 
14 that we had before? 
15 MR. ECHARD: Let me cite you some language from 
16 Staker. On page 421 of Staker, they are specifically 
17 reviewing the Halliday case and what was reversed. In 
18 quoting the Halliday case they said, "by the same token, a 
19 claimant cannot assert boundary by acquiescence if he or 
20 his predecessor in title had reason to know the true 
21 location of the boundary during the period of acquiescence. 
22 Staker specifically overruled that, specifically by quoting 
23 the language overruled that. And indicated specifically, 
24 Justice Howe, they quoted Justice Howe in his objection to 
25 Halliday when they did Staker because he became the 
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majority instead of the minority. When he said, Justice 
Howe concluded in his descending opinion to Halliday, "it 
is not unjust in certain cases to require disputed owners 
to live with what they and their predecessors have 
acquiesced in for a long period of time". And then they go 
on and state again that the fact that it was unknown at the 
time or that they had reason to know the true boundary 
didn't have any effect anymore. (Inaudible) 
Now, if I understand what he is saying and what I 
understand the Court said is that even though there 
indolence and we met our burden on that, that the fact the 
parties knew the true boundaries, defeated our case. 
THE COURT: To the extent I created some 
confusion with the use of that word, when I revisit this, I 
may need to clarify that. 
MR. ECHARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: What the Court ruling really was 
trying to get at there is that I suppose had these parties 
been in conflict from the get-go and it was clear that 
there was confusion about the boundary line and I don't 
want to try to get back into Halliday because I'm not 
attempting to do that. But then it's certainly indolence 
for one party just to sit back and allow usage of the 
property to be made. But as Mr. Maak has argued — and I 
always apologize when I read your name I want to say Mock 
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1 and it's Maak that you do by. 
2 MR* MAAK: It is, your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: That as Mr. Maak has argued, he is 
4 right on in his argument about what my findings were in 
5 this case and that is that I have never found —• and I 
6 remember this case very clearly. As you both know, we 
7 walked out there in the snow arid walked that boundary line 
8 and it was well tried by both of you. I remember the facts 
9 I very well. What is so obvious when you are out there is 
10 that you have a square line that follows the other 
11 boundaries that are in the area and it is, they have 
12 demarcated from that line to travel a route that made the 
13 installation of a stock fence that would stay in place 
14 possibly* 
15 And as I talked about a few moments ago on this 
16 record, there are areas where that could have been done on 
17 the old boundary line but you had to go through that big 
18 1 swell in the valley area and it is obvious, and I believe 
19 there were some pictures shown to this effect that when you 
20 go down through the swell that the tension, if you can't 
21 maintain tension on the fence that it eventually pops that 
22 fence up out of that swell and the cows can walk underneath 
23 the fence. That problem, and I'm finding from the 
24 testimony and view of the land, caused the fence to be put 
25 in in a different location not in anyway to establish a 
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boundary but simply put in to control stock* 
MR. ECHARD: May I make a comment on that? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ECHARD: Factual. I didn't make a motion 
based upon factual findings of Court but now it gets to 
that point. The Court has to remember there was testimony 
that tons and tons of material was taken out of that area 
and washed down in the lower area to fill in an unlevel 
area. What you saw was not the condition of that area at 
the time the fence line could have been put in. What you 
saw was an altered area that was done specifically by 
washing water through it and took tons dovm below, plus the 
fact the parties testified that there was a fence in place, 
you found that were posts in that area. . They testified 
that they put the fence back in that area, there is a fence 
existing .in that area now so it's not a question of whether 
they could, it's a question of maybe whether it was 
convenient and I understand that's what the Court's saying. 
But to conclude from what you saw up there that day, that 
that was the condition at the time the fence was changed is 
not supported by new evidence. 
THE COURT: Well, there was testimony to support 
that that uneven ground existed and that is why they moved 
the fence where they did. 
MR. ECHARD: Right. 
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THE COURT: And it is not my recollection that 
the testimony was that the washing that occurred took the 
ground from the hilly, precisely the area where the fence 
could not be put in but there was some washing that took 
place — 
MR, ECHARD: It enlarged it, I think, is what 
really happened. 
THE COURT: — but, back to my findings and this 
is what I want to make clear, and I'm not saying that I'm 
not willing to look at your case law again. I'll revisit 
it. I wish that I had revisited it intensely before taking 
the bench today and I apologize to you counsel. As you 
know it wasn't on the calendar. Again, it's that Morgan 
snafu we keep running into. 
But, the finding of the Court, and there is no 
question in my mind that the boundary line was clear to the 
parties back then. There is testimony that it was clear 
back then. There's remnants of an old fence along the 
boundary. But this fence demarcated from that course for 
the convenience of putting a stock fence is where they felt 
the stock fence could last and be maintained so that the 
stock would be controlled. 
And so what I'm saying is the argument that Mr. 
Maak is making is accurate that that was the Court's 
finding and, therefore, what he is saying is that it's not 
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1 f a quest ion- of now acquiescing in a new line that was a 
2 j disputed boundary line. That fence was never put in to be 
3 the boundary line and so that/ so when I use the word 
4 indolence, and I should clarify this. 
5 I suppose I was thinking out loud somewhat from 
6 the perspective of a land owner that now in hind sight, if 
7 I'm over there on the side of the folks that were being 
8 represented by Mr. Maak, they might look at it and say well 
9 in hindsight we should have gone out there and put up 
10 another fence in and seen to it that nobody ever crossed 
11 over onto that other property* And they didn't do that*, 
12 But, again, I've never found that the fence line that was 
13 put in on the angle was intended to be a boundary line* 
14 MR. ECHARD: Okay. But that's-my whole point. 
15 The law does not require that. It specifically allows my 
16 client to prevail without having to establish that. That 
17 is the whole point of the law that Irve cited over and over 
18 in these memorandums. 
19 THE COURT: And if I could repeat, and I want to 
20 I make sure you know that I understand what you're arguing. 
21 You are argument really says, if I can't state again the 
22 negative point. That even if the parties knew very 
23 clearly, because, again, for the record we were taking 
24 about section lines that were those old exact section lines 
25 that were very square. But even though the parties knew 
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1 that, what you are saying is that even if they put the 
2 stock fence in for the containment of stock and it never 
3 was intended to be the boundary. 
4 MR, ECHARD: A line of convenience. 
5 THE COURT: A line, whatever. But now that the 
6 time passes — 
7 MR. ECHARD: Right. 
8 THE COURT: And that we have now usage made by 
9 Wilkinsons and there was evidence of some crop cultivation, 
10 not right up to the boundary line -— 
11 MR. ECHARD: Almost-
12 THE COURT: But not all the way along the 
13 boundary line. 
14 MR. ECHARD: Right. 
15 THE COURT: But, in the kind of upper northern 
16 area of Stan's property and that there couldn't be a 
17 i dispute that the stock, if any, that the Wilkinson's had 
18 might have gone right down to the fence line that's the 
19 stock line so they are in effect coming onto the Babcock 
20 property and coming down to that fence line. Your argument 
21 is that if the Babcocks or their predecessors in interest 
22 allow that to take place for the reckless a period of time, 
23 it then becomes the boundary. 
24 MR. ECHARD: That's correct. 
25 THE COURT: Okay. 
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MR, ECHARD: And I think that law is clear on it* 
THE COURT: And you do and Mr. Maak thinks it's 
not clear and I am willing to review your case law again 
that you've argued. Now, can I do this with you? 
MR. ECHARD: Can I make one comment. I think I 
need to find out if the Court is concerned about it being 
used for cattle. He keeps challenging that and that is not 
the law in the State of Utah. If it is used for imposing 
of cattle, it's sufficient. If the Court isn't concerned 
about that, I won't spend time on it. But he has 
challenged me to site some statements in the case that 
address that issue. He keeps saying that even if you 
accept my argument that the use of the land, the disputed 
land, for cattle is not sufficient. That's what I've 
pointed out in all of his cases are pre-1990. The Carter 
case specifically was used for the enclosement of cattle 
and the Supreme Court decision in Carter specifically talks 
about the fact that it was used for cattle. And they did 
not find that a basis for reversing it. 
MR. MAAK: That is not my argument, your Honor. 
And I'll state this, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Yeah, I didn't understand that to be 
there. 
MR. ECHARD: Now, what is the big issue on cattle 
ranch. I don't want to - he keeps saying it's only for the 
31 
1 purpose of cattle. If he's acknowledging that assuming all 
2 the other elements are met, so we eliminate discussion, 
3 that if the property was used for 20 years to enclose 
4 cattle that is sufficient then I don't need to go into it. 
5 But I've heard him say, last time in the argument and now 
6 that that is not sufficient and he challenged me to site 
7 some language in Carter that specifically referred to the 
8 use of land for the encompassing of cattle. 
9 THE COURT: Do you want to respond to that, Mr. 
10 Maak? 
11 MR. MAAK: My point, your Honor, is that the 
12 Supreme Court has said six times and has never been changed 
13 that a fence installed for the purpose of containing cattle 
14 rather than as a boundary line cannot provide the basis — 
15 MR. ECHARD: All right, I'll address that. 
16 I MR. MAAK: —only be acquiescence. The fact that 
17 I there are cattle occupying the place is not what I am 
18 talking about. 
19 MR. ECHARD: Okay. 
20 MR. MAAK: It is that the fence has a purpose 
21 different than that of a boundary. It is a purpose to 
22 divide or contain stock where the land is returned. 
23 THE COURT: That's how I understood it. 
24 MR. ECHARD: And Carter specifically was a fence 
25 that was put in to contain cattle. And Carter said that 
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1 indolence to that fence was sufficient. The Supreme Court, 
2 in addressing Carter, again mentions that it was used for 
3 the containment of cattle and for farming. And it made the 
4 comment that the true owner of the property had observed 
5 I the land and observed that the fence and all was containing 
6 cattle. That is clearly an issue in Carter. I ask you to 
7 read the Carter case and the Supreme Court decision. I 
8 have a copy of the Supreme Court decision on Carter which I 
9 can give the Court. I think you have the other one. I 
10 don't have that one available. 
11 THE COURT: I have copies of that already. 
12 MR. ECHARD: Now, the other thing that counsel 
13 made a big deal of is that somehow the Supreme Court 
14 overruled Carter and that that applies to this case. By 
15 the Carter overruling of the Supreme Court, that was very 
16 clear, that was totally in acceptable land. It was 
17 landlocked. That is not the sort of thing that is involved 
18 I in this case. That was not landlocked. The fence was 
19 installed, it was reinstalled. It may have been that it 
20 was not convenient to maintain the fence in that area but 
21 it clearly is not what the Supreme Court was saying. It 
22 was saying that it was impossible for the other person to 
23 have access to it. And you'll have to read those cases, 
24 too. 
25 So I think that when we come down to the fact the 
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Court, and by the way, I do need to cite to the Court this 
thing about indolence. They cite in here also, if I recall 
correctly/ I can't put my hands on it but I stated the 
other Supreme Court case earlier that cited that indolence 
was sufficient. You don't have to rely upon Carter for 
that purpose* The Supreme Court recognizes in, prior to 
Carter, the case I cited to you in my memorandum and also 
recognized in overruling Carter, that indolence had been 
previously established by the Supreme Court. 
Here it is. This is the Carter case from the 
Supreme Court and it says, In quieting title in plaintiff 
the trial court and the Court of Appeals is affirming the 
trial court's relied upon Lane versus Walker, 29 Utah2d 
1973, where we, the Supreme Court, stated that acquiescence 
can consist of indolence and consent by silence. So, they 
didn't touch indolence at all. 
So, the only question we really have here as I 
see it, I think clearly we showed indolence. We showed the 
knowledge of the predecessors and the other parties that 
the fence was being used to—the fence by Wilkinson and 
even there had been a comment that Wilkinson was trying to 
steal their land and so forth. They knew the use* We have 
evidence of aerial maps showing that this land had been in 
the land bank and had been used almost up to the fence on 
the one edge for farming. All the disputed area was 
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1 clearly, not all, the disputed area was used for farming. 
2 They knew about that. They knew that he was not sticking 
3 with the boundary line. They knew that he was not sticking 
4 with the old fence line but he was farming and grazing the 
5 disputed area (inaudible). They did nothing. That's the 
6 indolence. 
7 It seems to me what the Court has really done, 
8 your Honor, is by this line of cases, they've really taken 
9 adverse possession and said if you're there for 20 years, 
10 they let you adverse possess it without paying taxes. And 
11 you heard the cases and that's clear in that area that 
12 they've carved out. And that's what's happened in this 
13 case. They are saying we don7t care what the line was 
14 before. We don't care whether or not they knew it was a 
15 line. We don't have to have a dispute. All we have to 
16 show is a line acquiesced in for a period of 20 years that 
17 ( is occupied and then that settles the problem. And they 
18 cite cases, law reviews and everything that said, gee, what 
19 Judge Oak's did in this thing created a huge problem. We 
20 don't want to fight with this. We just want to say if a 
21 line has been there for 20 years, it's been used, it 
22 belongs to this person so we can get on with life. That's 
23 clearly what the court says. And I think that's clearly 
24 what we have in this case. Thank you. 
25 Now, as to the other issue, do you want — 
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MR. MftAKr Your Honor,, can I respond? 
MR. ECIffiRD: How come he gets to respond? I 
don't think he gets to respond after I respond, 
MR. MAAK: Well, I'm asking for permission. 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. MAAK: Your Honor, the problem is the cases 
don't say what counsel just told you they do. He hasn't 
read, I invited him to do so. He says those, that Carter 
was — 
MR. ECHARD; That's nothing new, your Honor, this 
is. just reiterating the — 
MR. MAAK: No, no. He says that Carter versus 
Hanrath was all about a livestock control fence. The truth 
is there were livestock. So what? The point is the court 
did not find this fence was installed to contain livestock. 
It is a boundary by acquiescence. I invite counsel one 
more time to stand up and show the Court the language — 
THE COURT: Let me interrupt, this takes on a 
little more flavor kind of like a debate where he 
challenges the other side to respond. 
I'm going to go back to the cases. I understand 
the issue very well and I think you both would agree that 
we verbalized here what that issue is. I don't think there 
is a dispute about the Court's findings. I'm not moving 
away in anyway from that finding that I made before. I'm 
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willing to take another look at the case law and I'll look 
at it all from top to bottom. And it's an interesting 
case. I think it's a case, I kind of get the feeling which 
ever way it went that itfs going to go up on appeal. And 
it's, I think each case that comes up on these boundary 
line cases have some unique facts to them. It's one 
they'll have to look at. 
MR. MAAK: My last point, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MAAK: The statement that somehow boundary by 
acquiescence has become adverse possession without paying 
taxes. That's just bull-claw. 
THE COURT: No, you don't even need to make that 
point because I understand already from your argument that 
that is your position that that is not where the law has 
gone. That's Mr. Echard^s and that's really where the 
split comes between the two of you. 
MR. MAAK: What he says is what the court is 
saying that any fence that people occupy up to creates 
boundary by acquiescence and he edits out the language 
"mutually acquiesced in as a boundary". 
THE COURT: I'll be taking a close look at that. 
I understand the issue. 
Now, your dispute as to how the other findings 
have read, can I suggest that I take a look at this, that 
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1 we schedule a phone conference in the very near future to 
2 make this decision and can we deal with the other language 
3 in the phone conference? 
4 MR, ECHARD: May I just suggest that the best way 
5 to do it is to take the precise language of the Court which 
6 is very precise and make up the findings? I mean we don't 
7 need to augment what you've said* I think you've covered 
8 it and whatever you do and subsequently if you do anything, 
9 just take that and make the language. 
10 The problem I have is counsel has, in my opinion, 
11 doctored a little bit to try to create things, For 
12 example, he talks about agreements and a lot of things you 
13 don't need to talk. 
14 THE COURT: And I will say this. There are 
15 times when I am making a ruling from the bench that 1 may 
16 | not cover every detail but they may be findings that are 
17 I consistent with what my findings are. And what I'd like to 
18 do, because for me to rule on that and then grant your 
19 motion to set this aside doesn't make much sense. What I'd 
2 0 like to do is then revisit this with the two of you over 
21 the phone and tell you what language I want to go with. 
22 MR. ECHARD: Okay. 
23 MR MAAK: Okay, thank you, your Honor. 
24 THE COURT: Thank you both. 
25 MR. ECHARD: And may I ask one other thing? My 
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understanding is the status is that the Court sign the 
documents with a holding of not been filed so the appeal 
time doesn't (inaudible). 
THE COURT: That's correct. 
MR. ECHARD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: It will not start to run until this 
has been decided. 
MR. ECHARD: Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the proceedings were adjourned.) 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT; All right/ are you there? Okay, I'm 
putting it on the speaker phone. Are you able to hear me? 
MR, ECHARD: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. MACK: Just fine, your Honor-
THE COURT: Okay- We are on the record now and itfs 
my in-chamber's record and this is in the case of Wilkinson 
Family Farm, LLC, versus Lara and Mike Babcock. And what 
is before the Court this morning is a decision or decisions 
to be made in some areas* The first one that I'd like to 
deal with is that the plaintiffs in this case have brought 
a motion for the Court to reconsider its ruling in the 
case. Is that how you saw that pleading? 
MR. ECHARD: I don't have it in front of me- I'm 
sorry, Judge. We did ask, and I don't know if it's Rule 59 
and 60 being combined, I'm sorry, I don't have the papers 
in front of me. 
MR. MACK: It was filed a motion to alter or 
amend a judgment. 
MR. ECHARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: That's right. Now, we're going to 
deal with that one first. I've reviewed the motion to 
alter or amend judgment and the memo in support thereof. 
I've reviewed all of the material that has been submitted 
1 by both sides in this matter and the Court is denying that 
2 motion. The Court is willing to stand on its original 
3 ruling and I find that the interpretation of the case law 
4 as submitted by your office, Mr. Echard, is different than 
5 my understanding of the law and I believe that there is a 
6 I requirement that, the fence that was put in, be intended as 
7 a boundary fence and it was, and it's my finding, and Irve 
8 made specific findings concerning this, is that it was not 
9 ever intended to be a boundary fence but rather a stock 
10 containment fence and that there was not an attempt to even 
11 I put it close to what the actual boundary of the property 
12 was. 
13 Now, having made that ruling, there was also an 
14 objection to the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
15 [ that had been submitted by Mr* Mack and I'd like you, I 
16 don't know if each of you have those available, I'm going 
17 I to suggest some changes and ask that they be resubmitted at 
18 J this point. 
19 MR. ECHARD: Can you hang on, (inaudible). 
20 THE COURT; Sure. Do you have yours, Mrr Mack? 
21 MR. MACK: I do. 
22 I THE COURT; Okay. 
23 MR. MACK: Whatever you do, don't change my 
24 picture. 
25 THE COURT: Your picture? Oh, the picture won't 
1 change- I'd kid with you more, I just don't know if Mr. 
2 Echard is back, 
3 MR. MACK: Oh. 
4 THE COURT; I probably should wait until he gets 
5 back. 
6 MR. MACK: I just asked while I'm unopposed. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. I assume you have your 
8' findings therer Mr. Mack. 
9 MR. MACK: I do, Judge. 
10 THE COURT: Okay. 
11 MR. ECHARD: I'm sorry, I can't find anyone 
12 available to try to find it for me. Judge, I'll just have 
13 to — 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Ifll read the whole paragraph 
15 J to you and let you know about the change. I'm dealing with 
16 the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and you have 
17 raised some objections to the way in which Mr. Mack had 
18 worded those findings — 
19 MR. ECHARD: Right. 
20 THE COURT: —and conclusions and some of your 
21 objection I agree with and I want to tell you how I want it 
22 changed. When you go paragraph 7, not paragraph 7 but page 
23 7, paragraph 16r I want that entire 16th paragraph out and 
24 it read "Wilkinson and his predecessors knew that the 
25 location of the boundary between the Wilkinson property and 
the Babcock property was the true boundary. Babcocks and 
the predecessors knew that the boundary between the 
Wilkinson property and the Babcock property was the true 
boundary. Both Wilkinson and it's predecessors and the 
Babcocks and their predecessors knew that the slant fence 
was not located on the true boundary". 
The reason I want that paragraph out is I believe 
in the rest of the paragraphs we cover adequately what my 
ruling was. That one goes further and has me finding what 
the Wilkinson's knew and there's certainly evidence there 
to support the idea that someone could have or should have 
known but I'm making a finding as though Wilkinson's 
testified or that I knew from their testimony that they 
definitely knew what the boundary was and just to say that 
goes stronger and it goes further than what 1 was 
comfortable with. Do both of you understand? 
MR. ECHARD: Yes, your Honor. 
MR. MACK: I do. 
THE COURT: Okay. Now, paragraph 17, I want it 
to read the boundary between the Wilkinson property and the 
Babcock property was neither unknown nor uncertain. The 
way it reads now is "the Babcock property is neither 
unknown nor uncertain and never has been unknown or 
uncertain" and, again, it's just stating that stronger than 
what I want stated. 
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1 MR. ECHARD: Okay* 
2 THE COURT: I like it written, was neither 
3 unknown or uncertain. Now, I assume that you'll be the one 
4 making these changes, MR.. Mack, so are you getting these 
5 down? 
6 MR. MACK: I am. 
7 THE COURT: Is that one clear? 
8 MR. MACK: Yes. 
9 THE COURT: Okay. Next is paragraph 19 on page 
10 8. It reads "Babcock's predecessors and Wilkinson and its 
11 predecessors agree that the slant fence would be installed 
12 and maintained as a livestock containment fence". I want 
13 that paragraph out * I don' t find from the evidence that 
14 they all came together and had a specific agreement about 
15 this slanted fence. I do find that that's definitely what 
16 Babcock's predecessors intended. But I don't have evidence 
17 of them coming to an agreement together to form an 
18 agreement to that affect. Now, one might argue that 
19 impliedly everybody understood that back then but that 
20 states that differently than what my findings would be. 
21 MR. ECHARD: I'm not arguing with you* your 
22 Honorr but Harry Wilkinson did expressly state that he and 
23 Babcock's predecessor's agreed that it be maintained as a 
24 livestock containment fence. 
25 MR. MACK: Ohr well — 
1 THE COURT: And — 
2 MR. MACK: Ifm not sure I agree with that but 
3 anyway. 
4 THE COURT: And I'm not saying that, and I need 
5 to clarify something* I'm not saying that that didn't 
6 happen and I'm not making a finding against that. That's 
7 what's a little tricky about me changing these. I go off 
8 the record to supposedly undermine the other findings that 
9 I've made. I am aware that that — and I think that was 
10 I deposition testimony/ wasn't it? 
11 MR. ECHARD: It was. 
12 THE COURT: I was aware of that from the 
13 deposition testimony and I will don't have a problem again 
14 with it being a stock containment fence.. In fact, 
15 arguably, any fence that's even when itJs on boundary lines 
16 are stock containment fences. Do you follow what I'm 
17 saying? 
18 MR. ECHARD: Yes. 
19 | THE COURT: But, I do find that the slanted fence 
20 J was definitely put in for that purpose and it did not 
21 | follow the boundary line, I've already said this, because 
22 of the difficulty in following the boundary line with the 
23 I undulations of the earth and what those steepness of the 
24 earth problems created to maintain the fence. 
25 Next is paragraph 20 and that paragraph I want to 
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1 come out also. It reads "Babcock's predecessors allowed 
2 Wilkinson's predecessors to use portions of the disputed 
3 property. The consent and permission, however, did not 
4 constitute any agreement on the part of Babcock's 
5 predecessors that Wilkinson's predecessors owned or had any 
6 legal right with respect to the disputed property^. That 
7 one, now that I reread that I'm not sure I have too much of 
& a problem with it* Let me just look at it one more time. 
9 I think the problem I have with it is the notion 
10 that they allowed them to use the property. I mean, they 
11 did but it doesn't appear to me that that there was a 
12 formal decision made and that's what that kind of implies 
13 is that there was a decision made to allow the use* I 
14 don't know that 1 really evidence of that. Kind of what it 
15 appeared to me is that we've got wide open spaces, 
16 certainly with large tracts of land and that they fenced it 
17 to fence off the stock so they wouldn't get out and they 
18 followed the course that was easier to put the fence in but 
19 I just, I don't think after that with the hilly and 
20 different topography because they weren't attempting to 
21 j farm it themselves, speaking of the Babcock' s predecessors, 
22 I just don't think they were paying a lot of attention to 
23 what was going on with the property. And one might argue 
24 that they, therefore, allowed Wilkinson to use it but that 
25 kind of implies an agreement I think in the way that 
paragraph is written. Do you understand where I'm coming 
from, Mr, Mack? 
MR. MACK: I do, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay- Any questions on your part, 
Mr. Echard? 
MR. ECHARD: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Twenty will come out. Those 
were the only changes that I wanted to make in the 
findings * 
MR.. ECHARD: May I ask a question on that, Judge? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. ECHARD: My recollection is I asked that your 
ruling make in your, well, at least I don't have a 
transcript of it, that specifically found that the 
plaintiff admitted early and to the indolence and so forth 
be specifically placed in your findings. And it was not in 
there. 
MR. MACK: I don't think that's appropriate, your 
Honor. You made a discussion about if this and if that and 
maybe this and maybe that and then you made specific 
findings that there was* There was no objection and that's 
in here* But there was no finding that the plaintiff, and 
what Mr. Echard is asking you to do is to find that he has 
met his burden in establishing his case which is what he is 
basing his objection and motion to reconsider. 
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1 MR- ECHARD: Except that that's what precisely 
2 what you said. I only asking that what you said be 
3 precisely put in your findings. 
4 MR* MACK: And, your Honor, that is, you said 
5 exactly the opposite at our last hearing, 
6 THE COURT: And I am not going to put that in 
7 these findings and I don't want it put in. And I might 
8 explain, Mr. Echard, that why I wasn't to make the finding 
9 that I thought all these elements had been met and 
10 therefore — 
11 MR. ECHARD: No, I'm not asking you to put that 
12 in, — 
13 THE COURT: No, and I understand that, and my use 
14 of the word "indolence", I as trying to use a word that had 
15 been used by the appellate court in describing someone not 
16 setting up and objecting to someone using the property. 
17 MR. ECHARD: Okay, but one of the elements and 
18 you found specifically — 
19 THE COURT: And whatever specific findings I 
20 found about their not interrupting or stopping the 
21 Wilkinsons or their predecessors from using the property in 
22 whatever way it was used, that I've already found. 
23 MR. ECHARD: But it's not in any papers, he 
24 specifically excluded it. 
25 THE COURT: Well, do you want to respond to that, 
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Mr. Mack? 
MR, MACK: Well, let's not speculate, let's look 
and see* 
MR. ECHARD: My recollection and I gave the Court 
a copy of the transcript and the language is there and I 
apologize for not having found that but I didn't realize we 
were going to do this. 
MR, MACK: Paragraph 20, Babcock's predecessors 
allowed Wilkinson's predecessors to use portions of the 
disputed property — 
MR. ECHARD; That's not what happened. The 
Court— 
THE COURT: Just a minute, let Mr. Mack finish 
and then I'll let you respond. 
MR. MACK: It also says that Wilkinsons farmed a 
portion of the disputed property and that their cattle 
grazed up to the disputed property. Now, what other facts 
are there? 
MR. ECHARD: Let me respond. The Court says the 
specific finding that it found that the plaintiff had met 
its burden in showing that the other side had been indolent 
in its, and I don't recall the exact wording, all I want is 
the exact wording. That is one of elements the Court then 
indicated that because this was a fence of convenience as 
opposed to, as has been mentioned before, intended to be a 
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boundary, they knew was a boundary, that they found against 
us. But he found in one issue that we showed the indolence 
but he found that that was not sufficient in this case and 
that's all I want this to show is that Mr. Mack has 
purposely not put that in and knowing the significance of 
that particular finding by the Court. And if the Court 
felt that it was significant enough that it made a precise 
finding on that and we have a right to have that put in, 
MR. MACK: Well, (inaudible), your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, hold on just a moment, and by 
the way, I didn't, I don't find that either one of you is 
trying to be tricky with the other one and I realize that 
in these boundary line cases that you may feel that there 
is very, you may feel as attorneys, that there is some very 
close calls in terms of what language is used and how it is 
viewed. 
What I'm concerned about is I don't want 
particular phrases to trap overall the finding that I've 
been attempting to make in this case. And let me just say 
this, the language in paragraph 20 that I took out/ I do 
think we need to say that Babcock's predecessors did not— 
and I'm trying to phrase this as we go, it seems to me they 
did not interrupt or — 
MR. ECHARD: Just what you said, that they agreed 
to let them, I don't know if you're using the exact 
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1 s definition of the statute when you referred to it and 
2 that's precisely what you're saying now. I don't know what 
3 your reluctance is in putting in what the Court said at the 
4 time that it issued its order. That's what findings are 
5 supposed to do. 
6 MR. MACK: And, your Honor, I think you should 
7 tell us what you want. 
8 MR. ECHARD: By the way, I (Inaudible), counsel, 
9 and that's what I'm doing. 
10 THE COURT: Yes, you do, and I've heard the 
11 arguments on both sides• What I want the facts to show is 
12 that the, again, we've already stated that the slant fence 
13 was the boundary line, not the boundary line but not 
14 intended as the boundary line but rather, as a stock 
15 containment fence and that the area between the slanted 
16 fence and the actual boundary line between the properties, 
17 that the use that was made by Wilkinson was not disallowed 
18 by Babcocks or their predecessors and that they did not 
19 interrupt that use by Wilkinsons. 
20 MR. ECHARD: Okay. 
21 THE COURT: And so the reason I am being somwhat 
22 skiddish about the word, use of the word indolent is that 
23 when I used that when I was making my findings originally 
24 from the bench, I wasn't try to make more of a finding than 
25 what I've just said. And it has caused me some concern 
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after the fact that it may be viewed by a court that I'm 
attempting to make a finding that is consistent with that 
ruling that you've argued about, Mr. Echard, to say that, 
therefore, the property boundary should be moved over to 
the slanted fence- And I'm not attempting to do that. And 
I am, and frankly indolence is not a word that I ever use 
in my day-to-day discussions with people so I was using the 
word out of that other case which I thought was the 
apellate court's way of describing that someone uses 
property and no one comes over and interrupts their usage, 
And what I'm really trying to say now is I'm making that 
finding that whatever stock grazing might have gone on by 
Wilkinson's stock over that fence line, nobody stopped or 
interrupted that because, in fact, there, was no fence 
allowing the actual boundary line to stop or interrupt it. 
MR. ECHARD: But I think also, your Honor, that I 
think you intended at that time, I don't know what you 
intended, but anyway, the evidence is also not only did 
they have cows, they also raised crops for a number of 
years which went up next to the fence, There's no mention 
of that on the disputed piece of property. 
THE COURT: And that's my point there is that I 
made a specific finding about the crop usage, it didn't go 
right up to the fence. 
MR. ECHARD: Right. 
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THE COURT: But it, there was some crop usage on 
a portion of the land- And I've already made a finding 
concerning that. And that's what I'm saying is that I 
don't want the use of the word indolence to go outside of 
what my specific findings were. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, I think the definition of 
indolence as you made specific reference to the case made 
clear what you intended but you did make the comment that 
you found the plaintiff or the burden as to that issue and 
then you made reference to the case. So I thought it was 
pretty clear. 
MR. MACK: Your Honor, may I make a suggestion? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
MR. MACK: Can we put back in the first sentence 
of paragraph 20 and state that Babcock's predecessors 
allowed Wilkinson's predecessors without objection or 
interruption to use portions of the disputed property. 
MR. ECHARD: I strenuously object to that. I 
think he is clearly trying to manipulate your findings on 
that because the law is clear that if a person uses 
property with permission that you don't read this. He 
didn't give anyone permission, he used it openly and 
notoriously and there was nothing done by the other party. 
That's different than saying that they gave permission 
because the Court has received no testimony at all from 
1 
anybody that talked about permission being given. So, I 
think, again, that it is clearly inappropriate in the 
findings. 
MR* MACK: Well, there was testimony that they 
agreed to maintain the fence and the cattle contained the 
fence and there was testimony that Wilkinsons farmed a 
portion and had cattle graze up to it. 
MR. ECHARD: Yeah, but I think that wording is 
better handled the way the Judge worded it just now rather 
than saying they gave permission. That assumes an asserted 
position that is clearly not supported by the evidence. 
But I think when the Court says that they used it for a 
period of time and the Court found that there was no effort 
to stop them from using it and so forth,. that it more 
appropriately fits the evidence as the Court indicated. 
MR. MACK: Your Honor, would you tell us what 
you'd like? 
THE COURT: Yeah. I'm trying to. We're trying 
to draft between the three of us over the phone here. It's 
a little bit difficult. Again, the word "allowed" in that 
sentence again is more than what I'm finding went on. I 
don't, in other words, if I had had someone take the stand 
in the case and said, oh yeah, we always knew where the 
boundary line was and this was our stock fence and, yeah, 
we knew those guys were over there doing some cropping and 
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1 that their cattle wandered over there and we allowed it and 
2 we talked to them about it and they knew we were allowing 
3 them to do that* I don't, I didnft receive that kind of 
4 evidence in the case. 
5 But what I am saying there specifically is that, 
6 and I didn't write down my sentence but it's words to the 
7 effect that, and I realize that you may not be comfortable 
8 with the phrase "did not interrupt" but if it can be stated 
9 more succinctly than what I'm stating it, that would be 
10 fine. I think I said something to the effect that 
11 Babcock's predecessors did not interrupt Wilkinson, maybe 
12 the use of a portion of the disputed property by 
13 Wilkinson's precedessors. Something to that affect because 
14 that's, in fact, what happened. I mean there were some 
15 cattle that were able to access that area and there was 
16 some crop usage that went on and nobody interrupted. 
17 MR. MACK: That's fine by me. 
18 MR. ECHARD: That's fine, your Honor. 
19 THE COURT: Okay. 
20 MR. MACK: Can I read it, your Honor, so there is 
21 no argument? 
22 THE COURT: Yeah, let's hear what you've — 
23 MR. MACK: I've written down, Babcock's 
24 predecessors did not interrupt the use of a portion of the 
25 disputed property by Wilkinson's predecessors. 
MR. ECHARD: But except that that's not correct 
because the only disputed property is right up to the fence 
and he, in fact, used all of it for cows (inaudible). 
MR, MACK: Well, I just wrote down what the Judge 
said. 
THE COURT: I wanted to say just that. Because 
when you say that, Mr. Echard, there was a little bit of, 
and frankly, I've been out in that type of country and 
driven cows around and I'm aware that they'll go about 
anywhere when you're trying to make them go somewhere else. 
So I'm not saying that a cow couldn't get right down, to 
that fence. But there were some areas with the tall, 
really well developed sage brush that, again, I don't know 
that anything, I don't even know that the cows went right 
down to that fence. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, at that point we had, of 
course, that's 20 years or more, closer to 30 or 40 years. 
You can't assume because the sage brush is sitting there 
now that they didn't go down there later or earlier. 
THE COURT: But again, all I'm able to find is 
that a portion of the ground was used not, and I don't 
think it's fair to say that all of it was used. And, 
again, I've made the finding that to the extent there were 
cows that might have been wandering in that direction, the 
only thing that would have stopped them would have been a 
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1 fence. And that was (inaudilbe) obviously in appellate 
2 court. 
3 MR. ECHARD: Okay. If you can make sure that's 
4 clearly in the findings then. 
5 THE COURT: Well, I think that to the extent it's 
6 stock containment and the way it exists right now I don't 
7 feel that Mr. Mack needs to put that specific of a finding 
8 in these findings. I want him to use the wording that he 
9 just barely read back to me and that will be adquate from 
10 my perspective. 
11 I mean you certainly have the argument that you 
12 made factually on appeal that if it's a stock containment 
13 fence, it contains stock from a (inaudibles). I mean for 
14 someone to argue and I don't think Mr. Mack can argue in 
15 good faith that the cows on Wilkinson's side never came 
16 down to the fence. I mean, -
17 MR. ECHARD: Well, that's the only purpose for 
18 putting a portion in there, and I can guarantee you that 
19 he'll be citing precisely your findings, saying that the 
20 record or transcript is not applicable because you put your 
21 finding in a precise language. 
22 MR. MACK: Well, Mr. Echard, I'm putting in 
23 precise language because that's what the Judge is telling 
24 me and all three of us sitting here know to a certainty 
25 there was plenty of area in the area of that slant fence 
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where cattle could not physically get in. 
MR, ECHARD: And I don't agree. 
MR. MACK: Okay. 
THE COURT: And that's something that I'll make a 
record of here. I cannot say that I know there were areas 
where a cow could not get to. But I'm also not making a 
finding that there, that the cows could get to every area 
of that fence. Frankly, in the time that I walked over and 
looked at the property and examined it, I didn't have that 
specific question in my mind as to whether there were any 
areas of the fence that the cows couldn't get to. 
But, in general I think that the appellate court, 
and, again, I don't think that a specific finding needs to 
be made because I think it was just portions of the ground 
that were used by Wilkinson and yet I've already, I think, 
made a finding that it was the stock containment fence and 
I think that goes both directions. 
MR. ECHARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: So, that argument is there 
(inaudible). All right, if you'll use that language you 
put in, Mr. Mack, and then that's, those are the only 
changes I wanted to make in the findings. 
I don't recall that there were any changes that 
needed to be made in the judgment but I do think that 
probably we need to have that resubmitted because I've 
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already signed the judgment and dated it March 30th. 
MR. MACK: Yes, I assumed that any corresponding 
changes in the conclusions, and I don't recall that they 
were tracked into the conclusions but any corresponding 
changes in the conclusions that would, as you've said, 
would also be made. (Inaudible) 
MR. ECHARD: I don't want to go through this 
again, your Honor. With all due respect, there are changes 
to be made — 
MR. MACK: No, that's what the Judge and I were 
talking to subject to the findings and I'm just saying he 
didn't say anything about the conclusions. But if the 
conclusions track any of the language in the findings, I'm 
assuming that that carries over and we don't need to get 
into the exact wording of the conclusions. They will just 
match the findings. Is that a fair assumption, your Honor? 
THE COURT: Well, I'm looking at the conclusions 
right now. 
MR. MACK: And they may not repeat all the 
findings, I don't any problem. Some people do, some people 
don't and I don't recall it happened in this case. 
THE COURT: Let me take just a moment. I want to 
read those and see if I think there's a problem because I 
didn't think anything needed to be changed there. Looking 
at your paragraph 3, Mr. Mack, on the conclusions, page 10. 
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"Babcocks and their predecessors on the one hand, and 
Wilkinsons and its predecessors on the other hand knew that 
the boundary line between their respective properties was 
the true boundary and knew of its location on the ground". 
I think I'd like to add the phrase at the end of knew 
there, or should have known. 
MR. MACK: Knew or should have known that the 
boundaries line between the respective properties. Is that 
what you want? 
THE COURT: Right. 
MR. ECHARD: Could we just put should have known 
other than knew because that again implies that somehow 
there's some evidence that they knew and I don't think that 
is supported. 
MR. MACK: Well, I don't agree with that, your 
Honor. All you have to do is look down the fence line and 
it's crystal clear where the boundary is. 
THE COURT: Well, not only that but I think with 
the evidence that was presented about the old fence post 
that were along the boundary line I want it to read knew or 
should have known. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, there is no fence line, your 
Honor, where the slant fence they are not on the original— 
MR. MACK: That is not correct. 
THE COURT: No, they were on the original fence 
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line, the old ones. Well, in fairness, there were two old 
fences. There was the old slant fence and there was some 
evidence that that fence that was torn out when Babcock put 
in the fancy new fence, that there was evidence of an older 
fence that ran down the true boundary line and that's why I 
want that to read knew or should have known. 
MR. ECHARD: Okay. 
THE COURT: Okay. The next sentence, the 
location on the ground of the true boundary was never 
uncertain or unknown to either Wilkinson and his 
predecessors or Babcocks and their predecessors. 
MR. ECHARD: Isn't that a repeat? By doing the 
first one don't you eliminate the necessity for the next 
one? 
THE COURT: I'll allow that to stand. I'm just— 
MR. ECHARD: When you said, that (inaudible), 
okay. 
THE COURT: Let me look at paragraph 4 for a 
minute first. In paragraph 4 it says in the last sentence 
there, both Wilkinson and its predecessors and Babcocks and 
their predecessors knew that the slant fence was not 
located on the boundary between the Babcock and the 
Wilkinson property. No, I'm going to let that one stand. 
I think that is accurate. 
The next one, Wilkinson's occupation of the 
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disputed property was with the permission and consent of 
Babcock's predecessors. 
MR. MACK: That's the line you changed in the 
findings. 
THE COURT: Wilkinson's occupation of the 
disputed property was with the permission and consent of 
Babcock's predecessors. 
MR. ECHARD: See, that implies that they somehow 
need verbal consent to it which you have found they have 
not but it had been merely a matter that they did not 
object to interfere with. I would suggest to track the 
language that you made in the findings. 
THE COURT: Do you have a suggestion? I'm a 
little uncomfortable with the language, Mr. Mack. Do you 
have a suggestion there for a change? 
MR. MACK: Well, in the conclusions of law, the 
factual credit before it is a finding that there was not an 
interruption or a complaint about it and that it had 
occurred for a period of time because it was visible on the 
land. I believe that that is a legitimate legal conclusion 
to be drawn when the only evidence is somebody does 
something, it is not objected to, and when people know that 
they are using their property. I don't know how else to 
say it. 
THE COURT: Let me throw this language out. 
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1 Wilkinson's occupation of the disputed property was not 
2 disputed by Babcock's predecessors. 
3 MR, MACK: That'd be great. 
4 MR, ECHARD: I think that's factually what the 
5 evidence was. 
6 THE COURT: I said disputed. I don't know what I 
7 said. Was not objected — 
8 MR. MACK: Objected not disputed. 
9 THE COURT: Was not objected to. I didn't mean 
10 disputed. I don't know why I said it. Wilkinson's 
11 occupation of the disputed property was not objected to by 
12 Babcock's predecessors. 
13 MR. ECHARD: That's fine with me, your Honor. 
14 THE COURT: Any objection to that, Mr. Mack? 
15 MR. MACK: No, your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Okay. The rest of it I'm comfortable 
17 with on the conclusions. 
18 The judgment, let me just see if it tracks. No, 
19 the judgment appears to be fine. Now, maybe the thing for 
20 us to do because I have not changed the judgment, what are 
21 your thoughts, Mr. Mack? I'll start with you in terms of 
22 the judgments. Do you want to resubmit the judgment or do 
23 you want to leave it standing with the date I put on it and 
24 then you'll submit amended findings of fact, conclusions of 
25 law? And then you'll also be submitting an order on my 
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denial of the motion to whatever that pleading was called. 
MR, ECHARD: (Inaudible). 
THE COURT: Alter or amend judgment. But you 
could put a phrase in there, somewhere it has to state that 
from this Court's perspective the appeal period begins to 
run from the day of my signing of the order denying the 
motion to alter or amend judgment. 
MR. MACK: I think that's fine, your Honor. Why 
don't I submit a revised findings and conclusions and a new 
judgment for you to enter concurrently along with an order 
that recites the judgment as previously entered and it's 
not going to be filed and the time for appeal runs from the 
judgment that is in fact (inaudible). 
MR. ECHARD: That would be fine with me if you 
just had a new one and you signed it again, Judge. Because 
it was signed inadvertantly by you not realizing that there 
was an objection filed. It was filed because of the 
county, there was a mixup I think, to indicate that that 
judgment date stands would be inappropriate because you 
filed this, you know, we're not in a position from a legal 
standpoint given the objections to sign it at that time and 
we were told it would not be. 
THE COURT: Okay. That sounds like you're both 
in agreement. The way Mr. Mack started doing it, sounds 
like you would be in agreement with that. 
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MR-. ECHARD-: Right. So the date of the judgment 
and the date of your denial of our motion will be the same. 
MR. MACK: One last itemf your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. MACK: There is an objection to the billed 
costs. 
THE COURT: Oh, that's right. I do have that in 
my notes. As was stated in the memo, what this has to do 
with is the Court awarding the deposition fee as a cost 
item in the case and I think it was pointed out in your 
memorandum, Mr. Echard, that that was a descretionary call 
of the Court. 
MR. ECHARD: It is. 
THE COURT: And the Court believes that that is 
appropriate for that cost to be included. I'll just 
verbarlize generally, I've included those costs in past 
judgments that I've awarded and it certainly appears to me 
that it was reasonable and necessary for those depositions 
to have been taken in conjunction with this case. 
MR. ECHARD: Okay, And I assume that Mack will 
prepare all three of those rulings subject to me for 
approval as to form. 
MR. MACK: I'll just send it to the Judge. If 
you want to object you can but — 
MR. ECHARD: Well, I know, but I'd like to have 
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it sent for my approval as to form so I can review it 
before it goes to the Judge. 
THE COURT: Why don't you do both, if you would, 
Mr, Maak? Put it into an approval as to form line on it 
for Mr. Echard and then also put the certificate of mailing 
and I'll rely, would be in the record here, we'll all rely 
on the timing of the certificate of mailing. 
MR. ECHARD: Can I make a comment on that? It's 
not intended to (inaudible) Mr. Mack, but that's in 
violation of every rule the Court has adopted. 
MR. MACK: You're wrong. 
MR. ECHARD: The rule, may I finish? 
MR. MACK: Yes. 
MR. ECHARD: And I've already had Judge 
(inaudible) rule on this issue and make a note as the 
presiding judge for this district that it shall not be done 
that way. I've also had the district court judge's Bob 
Bailey commented it shall not be done that way. The party 
is entitled to either one or the other. 
THE COURT: Well, — 
MR. ECHARD: Altercation of an eight day 
admission to the Court by (inaudible) precisely under the 
administrative rules or relying saying that we approved as 
to form, but — 
THE COURT: But, Mr. 
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MR. ECHARD: — is inappropriate. 
THE COURT: But, MR.. Echard, let me interrupt 
you. The reason it's inappropriate is that we don't want 
to create confusion out there on the part of the receiving 
attorney — 
MR. ECHARD: Right. 
THE COURT: — when he or she see's an approval 
as to form line and they maybe are real busy and they set 
in on their desk thinking they've got the opportunity to 
approve or if they don't that it will sit. 
MR. ECHARD: Right, that's correct. 
THE COURT: We just eliminated that because I 
just told you how we were going to treat this. Now, the 
only reason I suggested that is I wanted Mr. Mack to send 
that over and give you the chance just to sign off and 
approve it and it would go through more quickly. When you 
say you're entitled to either/or, if you're not comfortable 
with that then Mr. Mack can just do the certificate of 
mailing and just go that route. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, if he does, he has to give the 
notification to me that I have five days in which to 
obj ect. 
THE COURT: Sure, sure. And I assume — 
MR. ECHARD: But all we have in this case, again, 
is I don't end up in a situation like we were in last time. 
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MR. MACK: Now, Bob, I think that, let me talk 
about that. 
MR. ECHARD: Okay, but — 
MR. MACK: Bob, you know what? You did not say 
approved as to form on those findings that were submitted 
to you. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, I — 
(Over talking) 
MR. MACK: Your objections were not timely and 
you submitted a letter to this Judge suggesting that I was 
trying to take advantage and I personally — 
MR. ECHARD: Counsel, that's not what we are going 
to do now and I'm not interested in arguing the facts. 
THE COURT: No, wait. Let me say this. The 
reason Mr. Mack's hair is standing up on the back of his 
neck is he, and I'm not saying you're saying this, Mr. 
Echard, but he's concerned for the record and probably for 
whatever is being said to me as the Judge, that we're not 
left with the impression that he was trying to slip it 
through before you got a chance to object. 
MR. ECHARD: And that's — 
THE COURT: Let me state, and I don't think 
you're saying that. I made it very clear for the record 
that Mr. Mack approached this correctly in terms of 
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preparing the findings, conclusions, and the judgment and 
submitting them to you. They didn't come to me 
inappropriately. What sometimes happens here is that an 
objection will be filed and it will be filed but somehow I 
don't get notice of it as the Judge and then I'm looking at 
the pleadings, the requisite time period has passed. I 
sign them and I don't know that an objection has been 
filed. And I haven't even gone back to check to see if the 
objection that you filed, Mr. Echard, was timely filed. 
Yet, frankly, I assumed that it was but even if it was a 
few days late, it's fair that we deal with any substanitive 
objection that you had. So, that that's, I don't see 
anything wrong with what either one of you have done, okay? 
MR. ECHARD: And I'm talking about as of this 
date. On this date I either have to know that I have time 
enough to review them and sign them as to approval as to 
form or I'm limited to my eight days to object. I need to 
know one or the other because I'm hopeful that we'll get 
the language that we discussed. But let's just assume that 
there is another issue. I've got to know which way and 
which operation I'm under. The problem I have, and this 
happens more and more often by attorneys in our district, 
and I'm not referring to Mr. Mack at all, is that we are 
not given that opportunity. And in this particular case, 
if it is being submitted on an eight day notice then it has 
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to state under the rules that it will be submitted to the 
Court in X many days if objection is not filed. This 
notice on the certificate of mailing does not accomplish 
that purpose. So I don't really care which way we do it 
but I'd like to know what my perameters are. If he sends 
it to me approval as to form and he certifies to your 
Honor, and two days later you decide, Well, I'll sign it, I 
think it's what I said, then I've been denied the 
opportunity to do one or the other. 
THE COURT: Well, we are not going to do that. 
As I understand it, Mr. Mack, you're going to do a mailing. 
MR. MACK: I am-
THE COURT: And in that you are going to put down 
statutorilly what the requirement is. Now, this question 
does come up, I guess. Are you then going to do that with 
the mailing and then hold the pleadings until that time 
period is past or are you just going to do the mailing and 
send the pleadings into me counting on me to keep track of 
whether the time period has past? 
MR. MACK: What I will do, your Honor, is what I 
did last time. That is, I will submit it to Mr. Echard 
with a certificate of service and when eight days has 
expired, I will send it to you with a letter that says here 
are the findings and conclusions. They were served eight 
days ago and I have received no objection. 
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MR, ECHARD: See, and again, I'm not talking 
about the last time but the problem we have and it's 
broader than just this case, is that when all it shows is a 
certificate of mailing to me, that does not put me on 
notice that you are going to do it in eight days. You're 
telling me now on the phone but the certificate that is 
required is a certificate that says, you know, I'm 
submitting it you, you have five days plus three days 
mailing to file an objection. If you do not, it will be 
submitted to the court. And when you just have a 
certificate of mailing it does not have additional language 
and it has approval as to form, that is not properly 
notifying the other attorney that you are exercising that 
option. 
(Over talking). 
MR. MACK: I guess what I'd like you to do is 
have you tell me what this rule is because I am not aware 
of any rule like that. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, I will gladly try to — 
MR. MACK: Because it's Rule 4504 that governs 
that, there is nothing what you're talking about in here 
like that. It's not here. 
MR. ECHARD: That is the rule though. 
MR. MACK: Tell me what you would like me to do 
and I'll do — 
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MR. ECHARD: Ifll fax you a copy of the notice 
that traditionally you put on these things. 
MR. MACK: If that's the way you do it that's 
fine. 
MR. ECHARD: Your Honor, I don't want to go 
through on this again, I would like to submit them and not 
have any objection about the way it's been done. 
THE COURT: No, I understand that, so here's what 
I would like to see you do. You know it's interesting, 
I'll just make this comment that the language we've 
included in that Notice that tells someone that they have 
five days in addition to the three days that are allowed 
for mailing for a total of eight days -
MR. ECHARD: Right. 
THE COURT: I haven't checked the statute to see 
if that's statutory or if that maybe is a — 
MR. ECHARD: It's not quoted verbatim but it 
requires that kind of notification. 
THE COURT: Well, and so, again, you may both 
have a point. I think if you would, in this case, Mr. 
Mack, if you would include language to that effect that 
tells Mr. Echart what the timing is and I hope you're not 
confused by what I'm saying here, it's just three days from 
the date you are showing that someone is certifying that it 
went out of your office, plus five days for a total of 
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eight days, the eight days that we are talking about. And 
if youfll just state that in the notice. 
MR. MACK: I would be absolutely happy to do 
that. 
MR. ECHARD: And I'll fax you just one of the 
forms for you — 
MR. MACK: Do you know what I'd like you to fax 
me? Fax me the rule. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, Ifll fax you the form that 
used, too, so you'll have both of them. 
MR. MACK: I would like to see why I have to do 
that, why in 25 years I have not learned of this 
requirement. 
MR. ECHARD: Well, the rule hasn't been in effect 
that many years. 
MR. MACK: It's CAA and it's 4-504 and just show 
me where it says that. 
THE COURT: Mr. Mack? 
MR. MACK: Yes, your Honor. 
THE COURT: I'm not sure that, I don't have the 
rule in front of me, and the rule may not spell that out 
and that could be somewhat of a, a prac - in the area we 
see it come up a lot in this in the domestic area where 
we'll have folks that may not have the rules available to 
them and so just the fact you do a certificate of mailing, 
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I think we've kind of modified in the direction of having 
our notice spell out what it is that the rule sets in 
motion when you send the certificate of mailing and that is 
to spell out for someone that they have the eight days. I 
kind of suspect that's how it's evolved. 
So, again, I'm just asking you from the 
perspective that you both have expressed we don't want any 
confusion on this one. 
So, Mr. Echard, if you'll fax that to him today 
that form of that notice that we have used some of in this 
District. 
Mr. Mack, you might be right, it may not even be 
something that's required. Certainly, with this lengthy 
discussion that we've had on the record, I don't think 
there can be any doubt about the timing we're talking 
about. 
MR. ECHARD: That's correct. 
THE COURT: All right, now, anything else that we 
need to do at this poing? 
MR. ECHARD: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Mack? 
MR. MACK: No, your Honor. Have, have a lovely 
day. 
THE COURT: You guys, too. I hope I'm not at 
fault for making this more difficult than it should have 
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been but we're about through with it so — 
MR. ECHARD: Okay. Appreciate that, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you both. 
MR. ECHARD: Thank you, bye. 
(Whereupon the telephone conference was concluded.) 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF MORGAN COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILKINSON FAMILY FARM, LLC, a Utah 
limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LARA L. and MIKE BABCOCK, and all 
other parties known or unknown that may 
claim an interest in the real property 
described herein, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 960000010 
(Hon. Michael J. Glasmann) 
The trial of this action came on regularly before the Court, the Honorable Michael J. 
Glasmann presiding, on December 11 and 12, 1997, plaintiff appearing through its counsel, 
Robert A. Echard, and defendants appearing through their counsel, Bruce A. Maak, and the 
Court having heard the evidence offered by the parties and the arguments of counsel and 
having considered the matters on file herein, and the Court having announced its decision, 
now therefore, the Court hereby makes and enters the following 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC ("Wilkinson") is a limited liability 
company organized under the laws of the State of Utah. 
2. Defendants Lara L. Babcock and Michael Babcock ("Babcocks") are each 
citizens of the State of Utah residing in Morgan County, Utah. 
3. Wilkinson and Babcocks own adjoining tracts of land located in Morgan 
County, Utah. The legal description of the land owned by Babcocks is as follows: 
A tract of land situate in the Southeast quarter of the Northwest quarter (SElA 
NWlA) and the Southwest quarter of the Northeast quarter (SWK NE14) of 
Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
U.S. Survey, Morgan County, Utah, being more particularly described as 
follows: The South 525.00 feet of said Southeast quarter of the Northwest 
quarter and the South 525.00 feet of said Southwest quarter of the Northeast 
quarter of Section 30. 
The tract of land described immediately above is hereinafter referred to as the "Babcock 
Property." A part of the Babcock Property has been conveyed to others since Babcocks 
acquired it, but the portions so conveyed are not at issue in this action. The legal description 
of the adjoining land owned by Wilkinson is as follows: 
Beginning at Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian: North 160 rods; thence West 320 rods; thence 
South 72 rods; thence Southeasterly to the South line of Section 30; thence 
East 236.75 rods to point of beginning. Being a portion of the South half of 
Section 30. 
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The tract of land described immediately above is hereinafter referred to as the "Wilkinson 
Property." 
4. The northerly boundary of the Wilkinson Property is coincident with the 
southerly boundary of the Babcock Property. For illustrative purposes, following is a 
diagram showing the location of the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property in the 
vicinity of their common boundary, along with the locations of various fences. 
Se l /4 H^/4. 
gA&Cccz: p&£9*szz.T*t 
t 
* m * * M X * * * * 
1 
vsuu^ iaSfiHU paope&rt 
|nsl4-swfo. 
SW& N£/£. 
* > * 
y » « * * * x—*-
: * = * 
NwJ^. S£l4*. 
d 
Kl 
SE.CT1CU 30, T5N CIS 
5. In this action, Wilkinson claims ownership of the triangular portion of the 
property lying within the legal description of the Babcock Property which lies south of a 
fence slanting north from the True Boundary, which is identified as the "Slant Fence" in the 
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diagram above and will be hereinafter referred to as the "Slant Fence." As used in these 
Findings and Conclusions, "True Boundary" shall mean and refer to the boundary between 
the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property that is established by their respective legal 
descriptions. The location of the "True Boundary" is so identified in the diagram above. 
6. The chain of title to the Babcock Property began with a conveyance from the 
United States of America to James Williams during 1897. Title to the Babcock Property 
passed from James Williams to Elwood Williams and Mabel Williams, his wife. Elwood 
Williams and/or Mabel Williams owned the Babcock Property until 1958, when the Babcock 
Property was conveyed to Douglas R. Williams and James E. Williams, who are the sons of 
Elwood and Mabel Williams. James Williams and Douglas Williams conveyed the Babcock 
Property to Babcocks in 1992. 
7. Each of the deeds after patent covering the Babcock Property, which are 
mentioned in paragraph 6 above, describe the southerly boundary of the Babcock Property as 
the True Boundary, which is the half section line running east and west of Section 30, 
Township 5 North, Range 2 E, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
8. The Wilkinson family first acquired an interest in the Wilkinson Property 
when John Wilkinson and Alice Wilkinson received a conveyance of the Wilkinson Property 
in 1935. John Wilkinson and Alice Wilkinson conveyed the Wilkinson Property to Harry 
Wilkinson and Dorothy Wilkinson, his wife, in 1955. Harry Wilkinson and Dorothy 
Wilkinson conveyed the Wilkinson Property to Harry Wilkinson and Dorothy Wilkinson, as 
tenants in common, in 1976. Harry Wilkinson and Dorothy Wilkinson conveyed the 
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Wilkinson Property to Wilkinson Family Partnership in 1984 and 1985. Wilkinson Family 
Partnership conveyed the Wilkinson Property to Wilkinson Family Farm, LLC in 1995. 
9. Each of the deeds covering the Wilkinson Property that effect the conveyances 
described in the preceding paragraph describe the northerly boundary of the Wilkinson 
Property as the True Boundary, which is the half section line running east and west of 
Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian. 
10. In all of the deeds effecting conveyances of the Babcock Property and the 
Wilkinson Property, the boundary between those properties is described as a straight line 
(i.e., a line with no jogs or slants departing from a straight line), that straight line being a 
half section line. 
11. Wilkinson initiated this action against Babcocks seeking a determination that 
Wilkinson owned the approximately triangular tract of land lying south of the Slant Fence. 
A surveyor's description of the disputed property is as follows: 
A parcel of land situate in the Northeast quarter and the Northwest quarter of 
Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
Morgan County, Utah, being more particularly described as follows: Com-
mencing at the West quarter corner of Section 30; thence South 88°42/14M 
East 2463.67 feet to the true point of beginning; thence North 00°00'00" East 
10.64 feet; thence North 87°41' 19" East 450.84 feet; thence North 79°58'48" 
East 126.84 feet; thence North 76°23'47" East 1087.06 feet; thence South 
04°38'44" West 343.99 feet; thence North 88°42'14" West 1604.50 feet to the 
point of beginning. 
The Notice of Lis Pendens recorded on behalf of Wilkinson in this action describes the 
disputed property as follows: 
A tract of land situate in the Southwest lA of the Northeast lA and the South-
east lA of the Northwest lA of Section 30, Township 5 North, Range 2 East, 
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Salt Lake Base and Meridian, lying South of Fox Hollow Subdivision and East 
of the Dennis and Lenore Hancock property deeded in Book M79 at Page 551 
of Official Records, more particularly described as follows: 
Commencing at the Northeast corner of said Section 30, thence North 
89°09'43" West 1320 feet, thence South 2350 feet more or less to the South 
fence line of Fox Hollow Subdivision, the true point of beginning, thence 
following said South line, South 76°23'74" West 1087.06 feet, thence South 
79°58'48" West 126.84 feet, thence South 87°42'19" West 450.84 feet, thence 
South 00°00'00" East 10.64 feet, thence North 88°42'14" East 1550 feet more 
or less to the Southeast corner of the Southwest lA of the Northeast lA of said 
Section 30, thence North 290 feet more or less to the South line of Fox 
Hollow Subdivision and the point of beginning. 
That approximately triangular tract of land (whichever description is accurate) is hereinafter 
referred to as the "Disputed Property." 
12. At least three different fences have existed in the vicinity of the Disputed 
Property. A very old fence existed on or very close to the True Boundary in excess of 20 
years ago in the location marked in the diagram in paragraph 4 as the "Old Fence." 
Babcocks installed a fence very close to the Old Fence on the True Boundary during 1996. 
In addition, more than 20 years ago a fence was installed by Babcocks' predecessors, which 
fence is identified as the "Slant Fence" on the diagram above. The Slant Fence is the only 
fence that has existed in the area of the Disputed Property for in excess of 20 years. 
13. The terrain in the vicinity of the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property 
is generally rolling hills, but in the area of the True Boundary south of the Slant Fence, there 
exists unusually steep, cliffy topography. This steep, cliffy topography has made installation 
of a fence along the True Boundary extremely difficult in this area. Any fence installed on 
the True Boundary in this area would have been extremely difficult to install and almost 
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impossible to maintain. The tension in any fence installed in this area would tend to pull up 
posts and wires in the lower areas of the fence, which in turn would allow livestock to 
escape. 
14. The topography in the area of the Slant Fence, however, was like the 
surrounding topography and allowed easy, convenient fencing and was suitable for a 
livestock containment fence. 
15. During the trial, the Court inspected the property at issue in this action. The 
Court was able easily to see that the Slant Fence departed from the straight line of the True 
Boundary by sighting east down the fence along the half section line lying to the west of the 
Disputed Property. That the Slant Fence was not located on the straight line of the True 
Boundary is obvious. 
16. The boundary between the Wilkinson Property and the Babcock Property was 
neither unknown nor uncertain. 
17. The Slant Fence was installed by the then-owner of the Babcock Property in 
excess of 20 years ago. The Slant Fence was not installed to establish a boundary or was not 
installed in a location considered to be the boundary between the Wilkinson Property and the 
Babcock Property; rather, the Slant Fence was installed for the exclusive purpose of con-
taining livestock on the Babcock Property and preventing livestock from escaping from the 
Babcock Property onto the Wilkinson Property. The only reason why the fence in the 
vicinity of the Disputed Property was not always installed along the True Boundary was 
because of the topography in the area — installation of a livestock containment fence along 
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the True Boundary would be extremely difficult, maintenance of the fence would be 
extremely difficult, and a fence located on the True Boundary would not effectively contain 
livestock. The Slant Fence was installed where it was so that it would effectively and 
conveniently function as a livestock containment fence and avoid the extreme topography in 
the vicinity of the True Boundary. 
18. Babcocks' predecessors did not interrupt the use of a portion of the Disputed 
Property by Wilkinson's predecessors. 
19. The livestock of Wilkinson and its predecessors have, from time to time, 
grazed on the Disputed Property up to the Slant Fence. In addition, from time to time, 
Wilkinson and its predecessors have cultivated something less than one-half of the Disputed 
Property, but such cultivation was not up to the Slant Fence. 
20. In seeking governmental approval for their subdivision, Babcocks did not 
include the Disputed Property in their proposed subdivision. Babcocks intentionally excluded 
the Disputed Property from their subdivision application in order to avoid objections to 
subdivision approval and to enhance the likelihood of subdivision approval and not because 
they did not claim ownership of the Disputed Property. 
21. Babcocks and Wilkinson have on various occasions discussed exchanging 
various parcels of land owned by each for the mutual benefit of both, including exchanges 
involving Babcocks' transfer to Wilkinson of the Disputed Property. However, Babcocks 
and Wilkinson never arrived at any agreement under which Babcocks agreed to give up any 
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claim to the Disputed Property or to transfer ownership of the Disputed Property to Wilkinson. 
22. Babcocks and their predecessors have paid all real property taxes on the 
Disputed Property. Wilkinson and its predecessors have never paid any real property taxes 
on the Disputed Property. 
23. Wilkinson and its predecessors occupied up to the Slant Fence for in excess of 
20 years. 
24. Wilkinson and its predecessors, on the one hand, and Babcocks and their 
predecessors, on the other hand, are adjoining landowners. 
25. Wilkinson and its predecessors and Babcocks and their predecessors did not 
mutually acquiesce in the Slant Fence as a boundary between the Wilkinson Property and the 
Babcock Property. 
26. Wilkinson caused to be recorded a certain Notice of Lis Pendens relating to 
this action, which was recorded in the office of the Morgan County Recorder on December 
4, 1996 as Entry No. 71679 in Book M0124 at Pages 385-387. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby makes and enters the 
following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Wilkinson and Babcocks are adjoining landowners within the meaning of the 
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement. 
2. Wilkinson and its predecessors occupied up to the Slant Fence for longer than 
20 years within the meaning of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement. 
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3. Babcocks and their predecessors, on the one hand, and Wilkinson and its 
predecessors, on the other hand, knew or should have known that the boundary line between 
their respective properties was the True Boundary and knew of its location on the ground. 
The location on the ground of the True Boundary was never uncertain or unknown to either 
Wilkinson and its predecessors or Babcocks and their predecessors. 
4. The purpose of the Slant Fence was always and exclusively to contain live-
stock and not to establish a boundary. The Slant Fence was located where it was because a 
livestock containment fence could not effectively be installed and maintained on the True 
Boundary. Babcocks' predecessors and Wilkinson's predecessors agreed that the Slant Fence 
would be used and maintained as a livestock containment fence. Both Wilkinson and its 
predecessors and Babcocks and their predecessors knew that the Slant Fence was not located 
on the boundary between the Babcock Property and the Wilkinson Property. 
5. Wilkinson's occupation of the Disputed Property was not objected to by 
Babcocks'predecessors. 
6. Neither Babcocks nor their predecessors ever agreed with Wilkinson or its 
predecessors to give up any claim to the Disputed Property or to convey the Disputed 
Property to Wilkinson or its predecessors. 
7. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence or agreement does not apply in this 
action. 
8. Babcocks own the Disputed Property free and clear of any claim of Wilkinson 
and its predecessors. 
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9. Wilkinson's Complaint should be dismissed with prejudice and upon its merits 
and Babcocks should be awarded their costs. 
10, The Notice of Lis Pendens recorded by Wilkinson with respect to this action 
should be released and discharged. 
MADE AND ENTERED this 3& day of October, 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Midj^f J. Glasmann 
District Judge 
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NOTICE TO COUNSEL 
TO: WILKINSON FAMILY FARM AND ITS COUNSEL: 
You will please take notice that the undersigned attorney for defendants Babcocks will 
submit the foregoing to the Court for signature upon the expiration of five (5) days from the 
date this notice is mailed to you, allowing three (3) days for mailing, unless written objection 
is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration 
1988. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
DATED this day of September, 1998. 
Bruce A. Maak 
Attorney for Defendants Babcocks 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
was served this "^&" day of-Oeteber, 1998 by mailing on said date copies thereof by 
United States mail, first class postage prepaid, addressed to: 
Robert A. Echard, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2491 Washington Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Melven E. Smith, Esq. 
Smith, Knowles & Hamilton 
Attorneys for Defendants Babcock 
4723 Harrison Boulevard, Suite 200 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
{ 
Kris Henriod, Secretary 
